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The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is intended to encourage work. But EITC-induced increases
in labor supply may drive wages down, shifting the intended transfer toward employers. I simulate
the economic incidence of the EITC under a range of plausible supply and demand elasticities. In all
of the scenarios that I consider, a substantial portion of the intended transfer to low income single
mothers is captured by employers through reduced wages. The transfer to employers is borne in part
by low skill workers who are not themselves eligible for the EITC and are therefore made strictly worse
off by its existence. I contrast the EITC with a traditional Negative Income Tax (NIT). The NIT discourages
work, and so induces large transfers from employers of low skill labor to their workers. With my preferred
parameters the EITC increases after-tax incomes by $0.73 per dollar spent, while the NIT yields $1.39.
Jesse Rothstein
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International







Most means-tested transfer programs impose high effective tax rates on earned income. In
recent decades, however, therehasbeen atrend towardtheimpositionoflaborsupplyconditions
for the receipt of beneﬁts. In the United States, traditionalwelfare was replaced with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), which comes with time limits and work requirements,
and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was repeatedly expanded. By 2000, spending on the
EITC was 70% larger than that on TANF (Hotz and Scholz, 2003).
The EITC is often seen as an implementation of a Negative Income Tax, or NIT, but its
central feature distinguishes it. Where non-workers receive the largest payments under the NIT,
only families with earned income can receive the EITC. This feature ensures that the EITC
encourages rather than discourages labor force participation among eligible individuals.1
Saez (2002)argues that theoptimalincometransfer program willresemble theEITC iflabor
supply decisions are made primarily on the extensive (participation) margin, whereas intensive
(hours) responses lead to an optimal tax that more closely resembles the NIT. Given mounting
evidence that labor market participation is far more elastic with respect to the wage than are
hours among participants, Saez’s analysis supports the view (also advanced by Triest, 1994;
Liebman, 2002; Eissa et al., 2008; and Blundell and Shephard, 2008) that the shape of the EITC
schedule is a desirable one.
But Saez’s analysis, like nearly all optimal tax analyses and discussions of the EITC, pre-
sumes that the incidence of taxes is entirely on workers. As Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) note,
“this assumption has never been tested” (p. 29).2 A basic result in the economics of taxation is
that the economic incidence of taxes depends on the elasticities of supply and demand for the
good being taxed and not on their statutory incidence. If demand is less than perfectly elastic,
supply-side taxes are partially passed through to the demand side via changes in the equilib-
rium price. Effects on prices are are of the opposite sign as those on supply, so any program that
increases labor supply will lead to reduced pre-tax wages. This implies that employers of low-
skill labor capture a portion of the intended EITC transfer. Moreover, because EITC recipients
(primarily single mothers) compete in the same labor markets as others who are ineligible for
the credit, wage declines extend to many workers who do not receive offsettingEITC payments.
These unintended transfers limit the EITC’s value as a tool for income redistribution. Recog-
1This is clearly true only for unmarried recipients. I discuss the incentives faced by married couples, as well as
intensive margin incentives, below.
2Anderson and Meyer (1997, 2000); Bingley and Lanot (2002); Gruber (1994, 1997), and Kubik (2004) esti-
mate tax incidence, generally ﬁnding that workers bear much but not all of the burden. Lise et al.’s (2004) exami-
nation of the Canadian Self Sufﬁciency Project is the only evaluation of an income transfer programof which I am
aware that considers general equilibrium effects. In that study, the sign of the net beneﬁt of the program depends
on whether general equilibrium effects are allowed.
1nizing the endogeneity of wages thus reduces the attractiveness of work-encouraging transfers
like the EITC. But the practical importance of incidence effects is unclear.
In this paper, I show that incidence effects are extremely important to the evaluation of the
EITC. With plausible labor supply and demand elasticities, the unintended consequences of the
EITC operating through the pre-tax wage are large relative to the direct, intended transfers. Ne-
glectingthese wageeffects leads to quitemisleadingassessmentsof theimpact ofa hypothetical
EITC expansion on labor supply, incomes, and welfare.
I begin by extending the standard partial equilibrium tax incidence model to take account
of important complexities in the labor market: Tax schedules are non-linear and heterogeneous
across workers; labor is differentiated and imperfectly substitutable; and supply choices com-
bine discrete (participate or not?) and continuous (how many hours to work?) decisions. I show
that targeted work subsidies produce unintended transfers to employers, coming not just from
targeted workers but also from ineligibleworkers in the same labor markets. The transfer to em-
ployers is largest when the subsidy induces large increases in labor supply and when demand is
inelastic; it is paid primarily by targeted workers only when targeted and ineligible workers are
poor substitutes in production.
I derive formulas for tax incidence that depend on the labor supply elasticity measures that
are commonlyobtainedinempiricalwork: theelasticityoflaborforceparticipationwithrespect
totheaveragetaxrateon workers’earningsand the(uncompensated)elasticityofhoursworked,
conditional on participation, with respect to the marginal tax rate. Although both average and
marginaltax ratesvary substantiallyacross evensimilarly-skilledworkers, Ishowthatincidence
calculations can proceed based on aggregate data with only the mean rates within appropriately-
deﬁned cells.
To evaluate the importance of incidence considerations, I contrast two alternative income
transfer policies: a small EITC expansion and a comparably-sized NIT, both targeted at families
with children. Using data from the 1993 March Current Population Survey – describing the
labor market immediately before a large EITC expansion in the mid-1990s – I simulate the
impact on the female labor market of adding each program to the actual 1992 tax schedule. I
examine effects on labor supply, earnings, and net transfers, both for all women and for women
disaggregated by EITC eligibility (i.e., the presence of children), marital status, and skill.
I treat elasticities and other parameters as known.3 While I consider a range of plausible
values, I focus on cases in which labor supply is more elastic at the extensive margin than at the
intensive margin. In this case, with ﬁxed wages the EITC causes net increases in low-skilled
3A companion paper (Rothstein, 2008) uses the actual mid-1990s EITC expansion to estimate the elasticities
of labor supply and demand that are needed for incidence calculations. The results of that paper inform the choice
of elasticity values here.
2women’s labor supply, while the NIT reduces supply. Thus, Saez (2002) concludes that the
optimal schedule resembles the EITC.
Most discussions of the elasticity implicitly assume that labor demand is inﬁnitely elastic.
The EITC induces women to supply more labor, and therefore yields increase in incomes over
and above the direct tax transfer. In my baseline simulation, I estimate that low-skill mothers’
incomes would rise by $1.39 for every dollarspent on the program. When I allow for a ﬁnite de-
mand elasticity, however, I ﬁnd that the EITC produces sizable reductions in equilibrium wages
that offset many of its beneﬁts to low-skill workers. With my preferred parameters, the net-of-
tax incomes of women with children rise by only $1.07 for each dollar spent on the program.
Moreover, this is accompanied by a decline of $0.34 in the net-of-tax incomes of women with-
out children, which are pushed downward both by falling wages and by reduced labor supply.
The contrast with the NIT is dramatic. The NIT imposes positive tax rates on earnings, leading
to net reductions in labor supply among eligible women and thereby to increased wages. A
dollar of government expenditure on the NIT produces a $0.97 increase in the after-tax incomes
of women with children and an increase of $0.42 for women without children.
After-tax incomes are a misleading guide to the relative welfare consequences of the EITC
and NIT, as much of the change in incomes is offset by changes in the consumption of leisure.4
Again using my preferred parameters, a dollar of EITC spending produces net increases in the
welfare of women with children with cash value of only $0.83 (as compared with $1 when
demand is perfectly elastic). Employers of low-skill labor capture $0.36 via reduced wage
bills, while the welfare of (EITC-ineligible) childless women falls by the equivalent of $0.18.
Moreover, this obscures the even worse welfare consequences for single mothers, the primary
group targeted by the EITC. Fully 55% of the marginal EITC dollar given to this group is
captured by employers through reduced wages, and single childless women lose almost exactly
as much as single mothers gain. Again, the NIT offers a dramatic contrast: The welfare of
women with children rises by the equivalent of $1.32 and that of women without children by
$0.23, with transfers of $0.55 from employers to their workers magnifying the direct transfer
from the government.
There are several limitations to my analysis. First, I ignore the taxes that would be needed
to ﬁnance the proposed EITC and NIT programs. These would presumably be levied on higher-
income taxpayers, though their incidence too is unclear. Second, I examine only the ﬁrst-order
effects of tax policy on wages, not second- and third-order effects on other prices. The analysis
is thus not fully general equilibrium. Third, I neglect many of the complexities introduced by
4In general, the effects of work-encouraging (respectively, work-discouraging) programs on incomes will ex-
ceed (fall short of) the effects on welfare, as the income measure does not account for the disutility of work.
However, in the words of Besley and Coate (1995), “[t]here is little evidence that the poor’s leisure is valued by
policy makers.” See also Besley and Coate (1992) and Mofﬁtt (2006).
3nonlinearincometax schedules. Iimplicitlyassumethatsmalltaxchanges willnotlead workers
to jump from one segment of the tax schedule to another. This is unrealistic, but is necessary to
obtain simple expressions for incidence effects and is unlikely to substantially affect the results.
Finally, I do not extend the analysis to derive the implications for the optimal tax schedule. At a
minimum, however, my simulation results suggest caution in deriving policy conclusions from
models with ﬁxed wages. Allowing for plausible labor demand elasticities leads to substantial
changes in the distribution of outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I develop the theoretical framework. The EITC
program is described in Section 3. I also review there the evidence on the EITC’s labor supply
effects. Section 4 describes the data and tax simulation. Section 5 introduces the EITC and NIT
policy alternatives. Section 6 describes the details of the simulation. Section 7 presents results.
Section 8 concludes.
2 A Model of Tax Incidence
In this section, I develop a model of partial equilibrium tax incidence that is suitableto the com-
plexities of the labor market. I begin with a simple textbook presentation, then gradually extend
it to allow for heterogeneity across workers, non-proportional taxes, and distinct participation
and hours choices.
2.1 The Textbook Model
I begin with constant-elasticity supply and demand functions for a homogenous good, with
proportional taxes levied on the supplier:
(1) LS(w) = a(w(1−t))
s and LD(w) = bwr.
Here, w is the price faced by the demander, w(1−t) is the net-of-tax price received by the
supplier, and s > 0 and r < 0 are the price elasticities of supply and demand, respectively. The
equilibrium pre-tax price and quantity are













Thus, the demand side (in the market for labor, employers) bears a share s
s−r of taxes–dlnw =
−s
s−rdln(1−t) ≈ s
s−rdt–and the supply side bears the remaining
−r
s−r share. The demand-






. It is smaller in magnitude than the statutory tax whenever supply is at all elastic
4(s > 0) and demand is less than perfectly elastic (r >−¥); it is smallest when supply is highly
elastic and demand highly inelastic.
2.2 Incidence with heterogeneous workers
Workers of different skills are not perfectly substitutablein production, and even workers of the
same skillmay face different tax rates. Thetextbook model can be extended to allowfor distinct
labor markets and for tax rates that differ both across and within markets. For the moment, I
maintain the assumptions of proportional taxes and a single labor supply elasticity. The supply
of individual i working in market s is
Lis = ai(ws(1−tis))
s . (3)
This expression allows tax rates to vary freely across individuals, but assumes that the pre-tax
wage is constant across workers in the same market. The total labor supplied to market s is













Using (3) and again approximating dln(1−tis) ≈ −dtis, this yields








where dts ≡ L−1
s åiLisdtis. Thus, aggregate labor supply to market s depends on the wage in
that market and on the weighted mean tax rate in the market, using individuals’ baseline labor
supplies as weights.
Next, I need to model the determination of wages. I assumethat workers within each market
areperfect substitutesand thattotaleffectivelaborsupplyisaConstantElasticityofSubstitution












Here, r is the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor. Cost minimization
implies a set of labor demand functions of the form:





5where y = y(w1, w2, ..., wS) is a parameter reﬂecting the aggregate demand for labor. Note
thatwt enters theexpressionforLs, s =t, onlythroughy. BecauseIfocus onpartialequilibrium
incidence and not on changes in the price level, I neglect effects of taxes operating through y.
I also assume that the bs parameters are invariant.
Differentiating the inverse demand implied by (7) yields
dlnws = r−1dlny +r−1dlnLs. (8)















As the mean tax rate in the labor market rises (dts > 0), relative supply of type-s labor falls
(by
rs
s−rdts < 0) and relative pre-tax wages increase (by s
s−rdts > 0). Just as in the textbook
model, the employer’s share of the change in average taxes is s
s−r.
2.3 Implications for Subgroup Analyses
It can also be of interest to examine the distribution of impacts across deﬁned subgroups within




åi∈gLisgdtisg be the supply-weighted mean tax change for








Thus, labor supply of subgroup g is declining in the mean tax rate in that subgroup (because
¶ lnLsg/¶tsg = −s < 0) but, conditional on this, increasing in the mean across the entire labor
market (because ¶ lnLsg/¶ts = s2
s−r > 0).
Studies of the effects of tax reforms on labor supply frequently exploit contrasts between
workers who plausibly participate in the same labor markets but are differently affected by a
change in the tax regime (see, e.g., Eissa, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 2006b, 2004; Eissa and
Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). These can identify the supply elasticity without
accounting for wage effects. To see this, simply difference (10) between subgroups g1 and g2:
dlnLsg1 −dlnLsg2 = −s (dtsg1 −dtsg2).
Frequently, group g2 is not directly affected by the tax change (i.e. dtsg2 = 0). For example,
6in studies of the EITC’s effect on labor supply, women without children – who are not eligible
for the EITC – are often used as a “control” group. This terminology makes it seem as if the
effect on the “treatment” group’s labor supply is −sdtsg1. This would be correct if wages were
ﬁxed. But with general equilibrium effects this can be quite misleading (Heckman, 1996). By










This can be quite different from the partial equilibrium labor supply effect if the taxed group is




Ls dtsg1. By (9a), if dtsg1 > 0 (< 0) both groups will see rising (declining) wages.
Now imaginevarying groups’shares ofthelabor market, Lsg1/Ls, holdingdts =(Lsg1/Ls)dtsg1
constant. That is, we compare a large tax cut targeted to a small group with a smaller cut spread
across a larger group. The effects on employers and on group g2’s labor supply will be the
same in either case, but the distribution of transfers will not. If group g1 comprises the full
labor market (i.e., Lsg1 = Ls), the full transfer to/from employers comes from this group, whose
wages fall by s
s−rdtsg1. As the targeted group’s share of the skill-s labor market falls, however,
group g2 bears an increasing share of the transfer to employers.
2.4 Nonlinear tax schedules
Finally, I extend the model to a nonlinear tax schedule. Let the tax paid by individual i, be
an arbitrary function of individual earnings yi ≡ Liwi, non-labor income Ri (assumed to be ex-
ogenous), and demographic characteristics Xi: Ti = T (yi, Ri, Xi). The individual’s labor supply
decision will depend on the marginal tax rate on earnings, MTRi ≡ ¶T/¶yi, and, potentially,
on other aspects of the tax schedule. For example, a discrete choice between working zero
hours, which provides after-tax income Ri−T (0, Ri, Xi), and working h > 0 hours for after-tax
income Ri +hwi −T (hwi, Ri, Xi) presumably depends on the average tax rate over the 0 to h
range, ATRi ≡ (hwi)
−1[T (hwi, Ri, Xi)−T (0, Ri, Xi)].
It is straightforward to extend the incidence model to the nonlinear tax case so long as





(11) dlnLsg = swdlnws−s1dtsg1−   −skdtsgk
5This is a non-trivial assumption, as in many cases (e.g. piecewise linear tax schedules) standard utility func-
tions will not yield labor supply functions of this form. Equation (11) is perhaps best seen as a ﬁrst-order linear
approximation to the true nonlinear labor supply function.
7and labor demand as in (7). By (8), the impact of a tax shock on wages is proportional to the














As before, the tax rates in (11) and (12) are the hours-weighted averages across workers in
market s.
Empirical researchers often estimatethe effects of changes in average and marginal tax rates
on labor force participation and on average hours among participants, respectively. The current
framework can be used to incorporate these extensiveand intensiveresponses. I neglect income
effects here; the system is extended to include them in the appendix. Let psg be the participation
rate of group g in market s and let hsg represent average hours among participants. Total labor
supply in the group is therefore Lsg = Nsgpsghsg, where Nsg is the number of individuals in the
group. Let se and si be the extensive- and intensive-margin elasticities, respectively. Letting
dMTRsg and dATRsg be the change in mean marginal and average tax rates in the subgroup (as
before, weighted by hours worked), this means that dlnhsg = si(dlnws−dMTRsg) and
dlnpsg = sedln(hsgws(1−ATRsg))
≈ se(1+si)dlnws−sesidMTRsg−sedATRsg.
The overall change in labor supply in response to a tax change is thus
dlnLsg = dlnpsg+dlnhsg
= (si+se+sise)dlnws−si(1+se)dMTRsg−sedATRsg (13)





Several aspects of these equations are of note. First, note that the product of the intensive-
and extensive-marginelasticities appears in several places. This reﬂects the fact that any change
in hourly after-tax wages leads to an intensive-margin response, and that this in turn changes
the incentive to participate. Second, all of the tax rates are hours-weighted averages among
workers in the cell; the implicit assumption is that the change in ATRs and MTRs faced by
working women in an s−g cell captures the change in the labor supply incentives faced by
8non-workers. This is questionable, but may be a tolerable approximation. Third, if se = 0, (13)
and (14) reduce to the simpler expressions in Section 2.2, using only si and the marginal tax
rate. Similarly, if si = 0, we obtain the same expressions from Section 2.2, this time using se
and the average tax rate. Fourth, the same simpliﬁcation does not arise when only one of the tax
rates is changed but both elasticities are non-zero: A change in either tax rate inﬂuences both
extensive- and intensive-margin labor supply decisions via its effect on wages. Finally, wage
effects of tax changes are proportional to their impacts on labor supply. As discussed below, the
EITC has opposite effects on MTRs and ATRs for many women. The net impact on the wage
will depend on the sum of extensive- and intensive-margin labor supply responses.
2.5 Continuous skill distributions
The above model assumes that each worker participates in one of S distinct labor markets, and
that an increase in labor supply in one of these markets has the same proportional effect on
wages in every other market. In analyses of labor supply responses that do not examine wage
effects, it is conventional to deﬁne labor markets by observed education and experience. This
is less attractive for demand analyses: In the CES production function used here, a shock to
the labor supply of young high school dropouts must have the same proportional effects on the
wages of young high school graduates as on those of older college graduates.
An alternative is to treat skill as a continuous variable. Teulings (1995, 2005) develops a
model of job assignments when “close” skill types are more substitutable than are those further
apart in the distribution. In his model, the labor supply that determines the wage of a worker
with skill s (in, e.g., the inverse version of (7)) is the local average around s, with more weight
on skill levels closer to s. Moreover, in any cross section there is a one-to-one mapping from
wages to skills. Thus, we can continue to use the above reduced-form equations for taxes and
labor supply by simply re-deﬁning the market-level tax shock that is relevant to worker i as the















Here, d(w0, w1) representes thedistancefrom w0 to w1 in somemetric, K() isa kernel function,
and w is a bandwidth.6 As before, this local average is weighted by labor supply.
My main estimates use the conventional education-experience categorization. I also present









6This is formally identical to a Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric estimator of the mean tax rate among wage-
wi workers. In nonparametric analyses, one would allow w to shrink toward 0 as the sample size grows. In the
Teulings model, w is an economic parameter and should not vary with the sample size.
9kernel, and a bandwidth of 0.1 – as a speciﬁcation check. Rothstein (2008) explores this model
more fully.
3 An Overview of the EITC
TheEITC is a refundabletax credit that depends on a family’stotalearnings according to a four-
segment schedule. Four parameters deﬁne the credit: A phase-in rate t1, a maximum credit C,
an income level p at which the credit begins to phase out, and a phase-out rate t2. Table 1
describes the credit and marginal tax rate for a family with earned income y, depending on the
range in which y falls.7
All four parameters vary across family types and over time. In 1992, families without chil-
dren were ineligible, and families with more than one child were slightly more generously
treated (higher C, t1, and t2) than families with just one. Importantly, the schedule has never
depended on the number of workers in the household.8 Figure 1 displays the 1992 schedule.
Eissa and Hoynes (2008) review the EITC’s dramatic expansion over time. In the mid-1990s,
the schedule was made dramatically more generous, primarily by increasing C, t1, and t2 (i.e.,
by stretching the trapezoids in Figure 1 vertically). Subsequent expansions have instead taken
the form of shifting the kink points outward (i.e., by increasing C and p, stretching the trape-
zoids horizontally).
Liebman (1998) and Hotz and Scholz (2003) discuss the EITC’s labor supply incentives. In
the phase-in range, marginal tax rates (MTRs) are negative and substitution effects should lead
to increased labor supply, but income effects may partially offset this. In the plateau region,
MTRs are zero and income effects are negative. In the phase-out, substitution and income
effects reinforce each other, both leading to reductions in labor supply. Thus, traditional labor
supply models with continuous hours choices suggest a net negative labor supply effect.
But the annual hours distribution is extremely concentrated: 74% of women who work at
all in a year work at least 48 weeks, and 52% work between 38 and 42 hours per week.9 If
the participation decision is discrete, average tax rates (ATRs) on a woman’s potential earnings
may be more important than MTRs. The EITC produces negative ATRs for all primary earners
with potential earnings below p+C/t2, so should have induced increased participation from
7If Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) – typically earnings plus non-labor income – is above p, the credit can be
less than is shown in Table 1 and if AGI is above p+C/t2 the family receives no EITC.
8Since 2002, there have been different schedules for married-couple and single tax ﬁlers, though even the
married-couple schedule is invariant to the distribution of earnings within the household. Before 2002, the same
schedule applied to singles and married couples.
9Among single mothers who did not attend college, a group quite likely to receive the EITC, 68% work full
year and 57% full time. The source is the 1993 March Current Population Survey sample decribed below.
10single parents. Among secondary earners, by contrast, nearly all of the incentives are toward
reduced labor supply on both the extensive and intensive margins (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).10
The empirical literature on labor supply is huge. Hausman (1985), Pencavel (1986), Blun-
dell and MaCurdy (1999), and Mofﬁtt (2002) provide reviews. Three frequent ﬁndings are that
men’s labor supply is quite unresponsive to changes in the wage or in non-labor income; that
women’s labor supply is more elastic; and that low-skill workers’ supply is more elastic than
that of high-skill workers. As the EITC targets low-wage women, we can expect the relevant
elasticities to be fairly high.
A series ofrecent studiesuseexpansionsoftheEITC to identifysupplyelasticities,typically
contrasting the experiences of women with and without children. These are reviewed by Eissa
and Hoynes (2006a, 2008)and Hotz and Scholz (2003). Studies of singlewomen uniformlyﬁnd
that the EITC expands single mothers’ labor market participation, consistent with a substantial
extensive margin elasticity (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). Also
consistent with this, Eissa and Hoynes (2004) ﬁnd that the EITC reduces participation among
married women. Hotz and Scholz (2003) summarize the evidence as indicating an elasticity of
women’s labor force participation with respect to net-of-tax income between 0.69 and 1.16.
Another clear result is that effects on hours worked conditional on participation are com-
paratively small. Eissa and Hoynes (2006b) ﬁnd an intensive-margin wage elasticity for low
skill married women of 0.07 in one speciﬁcation and 0.44 in another. These are if anything
larger than those reported elsewhere (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996 and Meyer and Rosen-
baum, 2001). In a review, Meyer (2007) notes that the “lack of an ’hours effect’ [of the EITC]
is one of the more puzzling, yet robust ﬁndings in the literature.” Saez (2009) ﬁnds evidence of
bunching around the EITC kink points only among the self employed, again consistent with a
small intensive-margin elasticity.
Combining the two margins, it is clear that the net effect of the EITC is to increase single
mothers’total labor supply(Keane and Mofﬁtt, 1998)and to reduce that of married women with
children (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).11 Effects on the latter group tend to be smaller than those
on the former, and in any event there are fewer married than single EITC recipients. Thus, the
net effect on total labor supply should be positive. But few studies examine the two groups in
tandem.
Only a few studies have examined the wage impacts of the EITC. The contrast between
women with and without children cannot identify these effects if both participate in the same
labor markets. Thus, only weaker identiﬁcation strategies are available. Rothstein (2008) com-
10If the husband’s earnings are above C/t1, the wife will face a non-negative MTR from her very ﬁrst dollar
of earnings. She also faces a positive ATR whenever the husband’s earnings are below p+C/t2 but her potential
earnings would place the family’s total income above p.
11The appendix discusses evidence regarding income effects.
11pares the wage trends for workers with different initial wages, who plausibly participated in
distinct skill-level labor markets, surrounding a large EITC expansion. Allowing for skill bi-
ased technical change, he ﬁnds wage responses consistent with a demand elasticity of -0.3.
Leigh (forthcoming) contrasts workers in different states, under the assumption that labor mar-
kets are geographic, and also estimates r = −0.3.12 Azmat (2006) studies the wage impacts of
an analogue to the EITC in the UK, but focuses on the effect on the wages of recipients relative
to those of non-recipients in the same labor markets. In the competitive model outlined above,
this effect is necessarily zero. In this study, I sidestep the difﬁcult challenge of identifying the
demandelasticity. Rather, I takethisas aparameterand simulatetheimplicationsfortheEITC’s
incidence. I use r = −0.3 as a reasonable value, though I explore other values as well.
4 Data
I use data from the 1993 Annual Demographic Supplement to the Current Population Survey
(CPS) – the March survey – to simulate EITC eligibility and to calibrate the impacts of the
counterfactual policy changes discussed below. The 1993 data contain information about labor
market participation and annual earnings and wages from 1992. I select this year because it
immediately predates the large EITC expansion that began in the 1993 tax year, though there
is no reason to expect that the simulation results below would be importantly sensitive to this
choice.
I form tax ﬁling units consisting of the family head and his or her spouse, if present. Fol-
lowing the EITC rules, the family’s credit is based on the number of resident children under 18
or under 24 and enrolled in school.13 I compute hourly wages as the ratio of annual earnings to
annual hours. I exclude families where the woman’s hourly wage is above $100 or below $2, or
where she has negative self employment income.
Using the CPS sample, I simulate the EITC for which each family would have been eligible
in 1992 given its observed earnings.14 I use this to compute the marginal tax rate (MTR) that
each working woman faces and the average tax rate (ATR) on her earnings. I use a “secondary
earner” model, assuming that women treat their husbands’ wages and earnings as exogenous to
12Leigh computes this as the ratio of reduced-formeffects of the EITC on labor supply(of eligible and ineligible
workers combined)and wages. Leigh also interprets his results as indicating that all (or more than all) of the EITC
is shifted onto employers, however. This would imply inelastic demand (r = 0) and no reduced form effect on net
labor supply of eligible women.
13In complex households, this only approximates the tax units used for EITC eligibility. For example, I assign
a child in a multigenerational household to her mother, when in fact she might be claimed on her grandmother’s
return.
14The EITC also depends on the family’s Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). I use Taxsim (Feenberg and Coutts,
1993) to compute this, given the relevant variables that are available in the CPS. All further calculations use my
own EITC calculator.
12their own labor supply decisions. Accordingly, I calculate the ATR on a woman’s earnings as
the difference between the (negative of) the EITC credit due to the family with and without her
earnings, as a share of thoseearnings. Both MTRs and ATRs incorporate only the federal EITC;
I neglect payroll and income taxes as well as state-level EITCs and other transfer programs.
Table 2 presents an empirical analysis of the distribution of women with children across
EITC segments. I divide women by marital status and, for married women, by whether they
worked at all during the year. About 30% of single mothers do not work. Among those that do,
slightly more are in the phase-out (positive MTR) region than in the phase-in (negative MTR).
In the subset without high school diplomas (Column 4) , the non-participation share is much
higher, and a larger share are in the phase-in than in the phase-out region. Among married
couples, the majority have incomes too high to receive the EITC. Those who are eligible are
much more likely to be in the phase-out than in the phase-in range, even when I limit attention
to families where the woman does not have a high school diploma. The ﬁnal rows of the Table
shows the fraction of working women for whom the EITC induces a positive or negative ATR.
All single women who are eligible for the EITC face negative ATRs, but the presence of male
earnings means that far more working married women face positive than negative ATRs.
The model in Section 2 indicates that the EITC’s impact depends on the density of EITC-
affected women in the labor markets in which they participate. Figure 2 shows the fraction of
working women at each hourly wage who are eligible for a positive EITC, separately for single
and married women.15 Throughout the bottom of the wage distribution, the majority of single
women – and essentially all single mothers – receive the EITC. The share of married women
receiving the credit is lower and drops off quickly at wages above about $5. Note, however, that
many married women who do not receive the EITC nevertheless face positive ATRs, as their
families would be eligible for credits if the women did not work.
5 Counterfactual policies
I contrast two counterfactual policy reforms, each treated as additions to the 1992 tax schedule.
The ﬁrst is an inﬁnitesimal proportional expansion of the EITC: A family whose credit was c
underthe1992schedulewouldinsteadreceivec(1+e), withe chosentoyieldtotalincremental
cost (over the sample described in Section 4, excluding single fathers) to the government of
$1.16
15These are computedby local linear regressions of an indicator for a positive simulated EITC on the log hourly
wage, separately for married and single mothers. I use an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.05. The
regressions are weighted by annual hours worked; women with zero hours are excluded.
16This hypotheticalexpansion differs slightly from the large expansion that in fact took place between 1992 and
1996,which movedthe kink points somewhatdownward,was proportionatelymore generousto two-childfamilies
13IcontrastthisEITCexpansionwithasimilarly-inﬁnitesimalNegativeIncomeTax (NIT).An
NIT has only two parameters: A baseline credit CNIT and a rate tNIT at which it is taxed away.
A family with earned income y < CNIT/tNIT receives a credit ofCNIT −ytNIT and faces marginal
tax rate tNIT; a family with income above this point gets nothing. Importantly, families with
zero labor income receive the full creditCNIT but are ineligible for the EITC. An NIT produces
positiveMTRs and increases in virtual income for all recipients. It also produces positiveATRs
for all working single women, whether or not they actually receive the NIT, and for any married
woman whose husband earns less than CNIT/tNIT. The NIT thus unambiguously reduces labor
supply.
To make the two policies as comparable as possible, I limit my hypothetical NIT to families
with children. Iset theratio ofCNIT for families with onechild and withtwo or morechildren to
be the same as that forC under the 1992 EITC, and set tNIT so that the NIT phases out entirely
at the same income level as the EITC (i.e., so that CNIT/tNIT = p+C/t2) . This leaves one free
parameter. I choose this to yield a total budgetary cost of $1, just as for the EITC alternative.
In my simulations, over 40% of NIT spending goes to families with zero labor income. As a
consequence, the NIT has much smaller impacts on the labor market.17
Figure 3 shows the tax schedules in the two proposed policies. Figure 4 shows the change
in mean tax rates that single and married mothers at each hourly wage would face under each
policy, assuming that labor supply and wages were unchanged. In each case, I consider the
proposed policies in isolation, and ignore the effects of other taxes (including the actual 1992
EITC) and transfers. The ﬁgure shows that the EITC expansion would reduce the ATR substan-
tially (relative to the amount spent) for the average low-wage single mother. MTRs would fall
as well at the lowest wages but would rise at wages between about $6 and $11. For married
women, the EITC expansion would increase ATRs and MTRs a bit throughout the bottom of the
wagedistribution. TheNIT alternativewouldincreaseMTRs andATRs foralllow-skillwomen,
more so for those who are unmarried. But the magnitude of these changes would generally be
smaller than those produced by the EITC expansion.
6 Calibration Methods
The equations in Section 2 provide simple expressions for changes in the relevant outcomes
– participation rates, average hours among participants, and hourly wages – as functions of
changes in tax rates. My simulationof theimpact of thetwo proposed tax policies thus proceeds
than to one-child families, and added a small credit for families without children.
17An NIT that spends as much on working families as my hypothetical EITC expansion would cost $1.79. As
all of the incidence formulas in Section 2 are linear in the tax rate, the NIT results below should be multiplied by
1.79 to obtain the effects of a policy of this size.
14in three steps:
1. Specify the relevant labor markets.
2. Estimate changes in mean average and marginal tax rates within each market (and for
relevant subgroups), given observed distributions of labor supply and wages.
3. Compute labor market responses, given speciﬁed elasticities of supply and demand.
I discuss each step in turn.
6.1 Speciﬁcation of labor markets
In the model above, workers are separated into distinct labor markets. Hamermesh (1993) dis-
cusses the aggregation of workers into discrete groups for analyses of labor demand. He notes
that the appropriate partition should yield cells within which workers are highly substitutable.
Most of the studies of the demand for heterogeneous labor that Hamermesh (1993) reviews dis-
aggregate workers by age, race, sex, or occupation. For the current purposes, there is little harm
in over-dividing. If workers in two cells are perfectly substitutable, demand for workers in each
cell will be highly elastic with respect to the wages in that cell, holding other wages constant.
The employer share of the tax burden would be determined by the (less) elastic demand for
workers in a super-cell that aggregates the two perfect substitutes.
Because the EITC primarily affects women, I focus exclusively on the labor market for
women. I assume throughout that men and women participate in distinct labor markets.18 In
my primary analyses, I subdivide the female labor market by the intersection of four education
categories (less than high school, a high school diploma but no college, some college but no
degree, and college graduates), ﬁve-year age intervals, and marital status. The ﬁrst two are
conventional skill proxies (see, e.g., Borjas, 2003). The last is motivated by Rothstein’s (2008)
ﬁnding of substantial divergence between the wages of similarly-skilled single and married
women in the mid 1990s.
In sensitivity analyses, I consider several alternative categorizations. First, I consider mar-
kets that are segmented by geography. I deﬁne geographic markets by state and, within state,
by whether the individual lives in a metropolitan area or not. I assume that each geographic
market is further divided by whether workers have some college (or more) or not. Second,
I use observed hourly wages as proxies for skill and assume that workers compete only with
18If this is incorrect,I will understatethe size ofeach skill-levellabormarketandoverstatethechangein market-
level mean tax rates. This will lead me to overstate the effect on pre-tax wage rates but to understate the size of
the group affected by any wage changes. These balance out, so the employer share of the tax incidence would be
unaffected. However, I will underestimate the share of the transfer to (from) employers that comes from (goes to)
non-recipients of the EITC and NIT programs.
15other workers with similar hourly wages. This analysis uses the continuous skill distribution
discussed in Section 2.5. Finally, for each labor market proxy, I explore separating or pooling
the markets for single and married women.
6.2 Simulated tax rate changes
For each family in the CPS sample described above, I simulate eligibility for each of the pro-
posed tax credits, using observed labor supply and wages. As discussed above, I treat married
women as secondary earners in computations of average tax rates. I then average across women
in the same market to obtain mean marginal and average tax rates. As discussed in Section 2,
these averages are weighted by annual hours of work.
I treat all intensive margin responses as occurring along linear budget constraints that co-
incide with the segment of the tax schedule on which the individual is observed. Hausman
(1985) emphasizes that some individuals will jump from one segment to another in response to
a tax change. An example would be someone who would reduce her hours, lowering her total
earnings from just above $22,370 to just below it, in order to qualify for the proposed EITC or
NIT. My strategy treats her MTR as zero, when in fact it would be positive at her new labor
supply. Two defenses can be offered for my approach, which will tend to overstate labor sup-
ply responses to tax changes around convexities in the budget set (points where MTRs increase
as earnings rise) and understate responses around non-convex kinks (where MTRs decline).19
First, the evidence suggests that behavioral responses to nonlinearities in the tax schedule are
relatively small. Saez (2009), for example, ﬁnds no evidence of bunching around convex kinks
in the tax schedule. Second, the consequences for my analysis of mis-measuring any individ-
ual’s tax rate are minor. The key rates are the means within relatively large cells, and these are
likely to be reasonably accurately proxied by my no-bracket-switching simulations.
6.3 Calibration of labor market responses
Given labor market deﬁnitions and estimates of the change in mean tax rates in each labor mar-
ket and subgroup, it is straightforward to apply equations (14) and (13) to obtain the changes in
labor market participation, hours conditional on participation, and wages that the two proposed
transfer programs would produce. I assume that changes in participation rates will not lead to
19The alternative would be to fully model the individual labor supply choice under the counterfactual tax
regimes. This would require assumptions about the full distribution of utility function parameters. However,
the utility speciﬁcations that have been used in the structural labor supply literature have a difﬁcult time explain-
ing the common reduced-form result that extensive margin supply responses are much larger than those on the
intensive margin (Meyer, 2002). Absent better understanding of this issue, it seems best to stick to a labor supply
function that is consistent with the evidence, without attempting to derive this from a behavioral model.
16changes in the mean wage of workers in the cell through composition effects (i.e. selection),
and that any composition effects on mean hours are captured by the intensive margin elastic-
ity.20 Finally, I assume that non-labor income, family structure, and male earnings are invariant
to the tax changes under consideration.
My baseline estimates assume that the elasticity of women’s participation with respect to
average wages is 0.75, that the elasticity of hours with respect to marginal wages conditional
on working is zero, and that the own-price elasticity of demand for labor within each market is
-0.3. Income effects are assumed to be zero, though I present speciﬁcation checks that allow for
them.
The supply elasticities roughly correspond to consensus estimates in the literature reviewed
in Section 3. But the demand elasticity merits further discussion, as it is central to the present
analysis and much less is known about it. My parameter choice corresponds to Hamermesh’s
(1993; 1995) “best guess” at the elasticity of demand for homogeneous labor; he suggests a
plausible range of -0.15 and -0.75. Although one might expect the demand for workers of
particular types to be more elastic, the estimates that Hamermesh reviews do not show clear
evidence of this. Moreover, Hamermesh’s guess corresponds closely to the estimates discussed
in Section 3 that exploit EITC expansions.
By contrast, more recent estimates indicate a much wider range of possible values. Gener-
ally, studies that exploit exogenous shifts in wages tend to ﬁnd small quantity responses, con-
sistent with inelastic demand, while those that exploit shocks to labor supply (typically from
immigration) ﬁnd small wage responses that indicate more elastic demand. Thus, for example,
the small-to-zero employment effects of minimum wage increases found by Card and Krueger
(1995) would suggest quite inelastic demand for low skill labor (i.e. r close to zero). And in
a study of worker’s compensation insurance, Gruber and Krueger (1991) estimate a demand
elasticity of -0.5. By contrast, the immigration literature is divided between estimates that im-
migration has essentially no effect on native wages (e.g., Card, 1990), indicating r = −¥, and
those that indicate small effects consistent with own-wage labor demand elasticities around -2.5
(Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2007).21
I have conducted extensive sensitivity analyses that vary the elasticity parameters. In the
results below, I present simulations that use elasticities of participation with respect to average
wages (i.e., extensive-margin elasticities) of 1, 0.75, and 0.5; elasticities of hours with respect
to marginal wages (i.e. intensive-marginelasticities) of 0, 0.25, and 0.5; and demand elasticities
20This is consistent with most reduced-form analyses, which focus on hours conditional on participation.
21Card (2009) argues that with an appropriatedeﬁnition of skill (focusing on the high school-collegedistinction
rather than the high school dropout-diplomadistinction), immigration has not led to a substantial relative increase
in low-skill labor supply. This suggests that the immigration studies, which focus on the impact on relative wages
of skilled and unskilled native workers, have little power for estimation of r.
17of −¥, -1, -0.3, and 0.
As seen in Figure 4, the EITC and NIT policies have quite different effects on the MTRs
and ATRs faced by their recipients, particularly their unmarried recipients. Before jumping in
to the evaluation of these policies, it is worth considering the implications of different elasticity
parameters for the net impact of across-the-board increases in MTRs and ATRs. Table 3 reports
the reduced-form effects of such increases on pre-tax wages and labor supply (combining em-
ployment and hours among the employed), using equations (14) and (13). The baseline values
are highlighted for emphasis. Relative to these, the less elastic is demand, the smaller the net
labor supply response to any tax change and the larger the wage response. Higher extensive-
margin supply elasticities produce larger reductions in labor supply in response to tax increases
and (for r > −¥) larger increases in pre-tax wages. The effects of increasing the intensive-
margin supply elasticity are more complex, as even when ATRs increase with no change in the
MTR, wage responses can lead to intensive-margin increases in hours.
7 Results
I begin by analyzing the case of perfectly elastic demand (r = −¥). This extreme case helps
make clear the direct labor supply effects of the two proposed tax policies, as there are no
indirect effects when the labor market can absorb arbitrary supply shocks without changes in
wages. Table 4 presents the simulated labor supply effects, using extensive margin supply
elasticity se = 0.75 and intensive margin elasticity si = 0.22 Panel A describes the proposed
EITC expansion, while Panel B describes the NIT. All effects are characterized in terms of the
total amount of additional (or reduced) earnings due to the addition of the small hypothetical
programs. Recall that each program is calibrated so that the total tax expenditure is $1.
The ﬁrst two rows of each panel describe these tax transfers. By construction, all EITC
spending goes to families with positive earnings. In my simulation, 55 cents of every dollar
goes to single mothers, and 45 cents to married couples. The proposed NIT would give a
notably larger share of funds to single mothers, 67 cents per dollar spent. 44% of the spending
on the NIT, however, goes to families without earned income, and over three quarters of this
spending goes to single mothers.
The next row presents the effects on thelabor market. By construction, theonly responses in
this simulation are on the supply side at the extensivemargin. My simulationindicates that each
dollar spent on the EITC leads to an extra $0.61 in earnings from new unmarried participants
and to $0.22 less in earnings from a net reduction in married women’s participation, for a net
22Note that the deﬁnition of labor markets is irrelevant with r = −¥, as there are no spillover effects from taxed
to untaxed workers in any case.
18increase in earnings of $0.39. The NIT, by contrast, causes reductions in participation of both
single and married mothers. Earnings fall by a total of $0.62. With perfectly elastic demand,
there are no spillovers to women without children under either policy.
The ﬁnal row of each panel showsthechange in after-tax incomeundereach ofthe proposed
policies, combining the direct transfer with the change in earnings due to increased or reduced
labor market participation.23 The labor supply effects of the EITC add to the direct transfer
to single mothers, so incomes rise by $1.16. Incomes of married-couple families rise by only
$0.23, as about half of the $0.45 in tax payments is offset by reduced female earnings. Total
after-tax incomes rise by $1.39. Under the NIT, the change in total after-tax incomes is only
$0.38, as the majority of the money spent on the program is offset by reduced earnings.
Table 4 clearly shows the EITC to be a more cost-effective means of raising low-skilled
women’s incomes. This echoes the conclusions of many studies of the EITC. However, this
result turns out to be entirely dependent on the assumptionthat labor demand is perfectly elastic
and wages therefore exogenous. Table 5 presents my preferred simulations, using the same
supply parameters and somewhat inelastic demand (r = −0.3). Where Table 4 indicated that
an EITC expansion would increase total earnings by $0.39, operating entirely through labor
supply responses, Table 5 indicates that total earnings would fall by $0.27. This reﬂects a
small net increase in labor supply (+$0.09) and a substantial (-$0.36) reduction coming from
decreased pre-tax wages.
Columns 2-5 describe the distribution of effects across single mothers, single women with-
out children, married mothers, and married women without children. Single mothers’ labor
supply rises by $0.35, a bit more than half as much as it did in the no-wage-response model.
Married mothers’ supply falls by $0.10. Recall that I model single and married women as par-
ticipating in distinct labor markets. Thus, wages fall in the single women markets and rise in the
markets for married women’s labor. In each case, these wage impacts are shared between moth-
ers (who are eligible for the EITC or NIT) and ineligible non-mothers. The wage impacts then
lead to follow-on changes in labor supply among non-mothers, partially offsetting the effects
on mothers’ supply. Thus, while the labor supply of single mothers rises substantially relative
to that of non-mothers, the absolute increase in single women’s supply is fairly small.
The ﬁnal rows of Panel A describe the total effects on after-tax incomes and transfers. For
each dollar spent on the EITC, total after-tax incomes rise by only $0.73. This reﬂects increases
for single and married mothers that are slightly larger than the direct tax transfers, and substan-
tial declines for single women without children. $0.64 of the $0.73 in increased total income
23With large policy shifts, there would be an interaction effect as changes in labor supply behavior lead to
altered credit eligibility. Because I focus on extremely small policies and I neglect their effects on eligibility for
other programs (including the actual 1992 EITC), the interactions are too small to show up in the Table and the
actual tax transfer equals, within rounding error, the intended transfer.
19represents net changes in transfers. Beyond the direct tax transfers, there are large transfers
from single women to their employers and smaller transfers from employers to married women.
Both are divided between women with and without children. For single women, the transfer
to employers is large enough to almost fully offset EITC payments, and welfare rises by an
aggregate of less than $0.01. But this reﬂects a $0.24 increase in the welfare of single mothers
and a $0.23 reduction in the welfare of single, childless women.
Panel B repeats the exercise for the NIT. The picture looks entirely different. As in Table 4,
weseethat$0.44ofeverydollarspentontheNITgoestonon-workingfamilies. Theavailability
of the beneﬁt to non-workers leads to small reductions in labor supply (reducing earnings on
net by $0.16) and large increases in wages (adding $0.55 to total earnings). Thus, the net effect
is to increase after-tax income by $1.39, and the net transfer to workers is even larger, $1.55.
Even childless women receive positive transfers and see increases in their wages and after-tax
incomes.
The negative net effect of the EITC on wages in Table 5 is driven by the large increase in
single women’s labor supply that the EITC induces with ﬁxed wages (as seen in Table 4). This
occurs because the EITC produces negative ATRs for all low wage single mothers. As I assume
that the extensive margin is reasonably elastic but that labor supply on the intensive margin –
where many single mothers face positive tax rates – is completely inelastic, the net effect is
necessarily positive. Although these supply parameters correspond with what studies of the
EITC’s labor supply effects have found, it is nevertheless worth exploring the possibility of an
intensive margin response.
Table 6 presents the simulation when I allow for an intensive-margin supply elasticity of
0.25. Compared with Table 5, the labor supply response to the EITC among single mothers
is dampened – an increase of $0.22 as compared with $0.35, despite a wage decline that is
only half as large. This reﬂects a participation response that is nearly identical to that seen
in Table 5, combined with an offsetting but smaller hours response. The net effect is to leave
single mothers’ earnings almost unchanged. However, single childless women’s earnings fall
substantially: The wage effect remains non-trivial, and this has effects on both extensive and
intensivemargin supply decisions. When we combine married and singlewomen, total earnings
fall by $0.07. This is driven primarily by wage responses, with approximately zero net supply
effect. After-tax incomes rise by $0.93, more than in Table 5 but still less than the ﬁscal cost.
Intensive margin supply responses have much less of an effect on the evaluation of the NIT
(Panel B of Table 6). Here, ATRs and MTRs move in the same direction, and the labor market
effects continue to produce a large multiplier for government spending.
207.1 Alternative Parameters and Deﬁnitions
I have also explored a variety of alternative elasticity parameters. Figure 5 reports the net
total transfer to workers for each of 36 values for the (se, si, r) parameter vector. The values
used in Table 5 are highlighted for reference. Each panel shows estimates corresponding to
a particular demand elasticity, for all nine combinations of three extensive-margin and three
intensive-margin supply elasticity parameters.
The upper left panel shows the case of perfectly elastic demand. In this case, the economic
transfernecessarily equalsthestatutorytransfer. In each ofthethreeremainingpanels, theEITC
produces less than $1 in transfers to workers whenever labor supply is inelastic on the intensive
margin. The shortfall is largest the less elastic is demand.24 Figure 5 also shows corresponding
simulations of the NIT. Under all 27 parameter combinations with less than perfectly elastic
demand, there are large net transfers from employers to their workers, magnifying the direct
effects of the tax credits. The size of these transfers is sensitive to the demand elasticity but less
so to the supply parameters.
Figure 6 shows how the distribution of transfers across subgroups (married and single, with
and without children) varies with the demand elasticity. I show estimates only for my preferred
supply elasticities (sx = 0.75 and si = 0) here. The less elastic is demand, the more employers
are able to capture via reduced wages to unmarried women, both with and without children, and
the more they must giveto married women via increased wages. In the extreme case of inelastic
demand, there is approximately zero transfer to single mothers (the primary target of the EITC),
a large transfer from single childless women to their employers, a transfer to married mothers
that is over 50% larger than the direct tax transfer, and a small transfer to married childless
women as well. Estimates for other parameter combinations are shown in Appendix Figures 1
(EITC) and 2 (NIT). One result is worthly of note: Even with a large intensive-margin supply
elasticity, the transfer to single mothers is notably smaller when wages are allowed to respond
than when demand is assumed to be perfectly elastic.
The estimates in Figures 5 and 6 assume that there are no income effects on labor supply.
Appendix Table 1 presents estimates that allow for such effects, modifying the methodology
described above in ways discussed in the Appendix text. Income effects reduce total labor
supply under both programs, leading to higher wages and larger net transfers to workers. With
large income elasticities, my baseline demand elasticity produces a net total transfer of $1.25
from the EITC (as compared with $0.93 with the same wage elasticities but no income effects)
and $1.76 from the NIT (compare to $1.53). Thus, my omission of income effects from the
24When the intensive-marginsupply elasticity is large, total transfers are generallyaround $1, indicating little or
no net transfer to or from employers. But this masks offsetting transfers from unmarriedwomen to their employers
and from employers to married women. See Appendix Figure 1.
21main estimates does not affect the assessment of the relative attractiveness of the EITC and NIT
as transfer programs.
Table 7 explores the sensitivity along a different dimension, using my baseline parameters
(se = 0.75, si = 0, no income effects, and r = −0.3) but varying the partition of women
into labor markets. I report the net total transfer and the change in after-tax income, both
for all women and for single mothers. The ﬁrst row of each panel repeats the estimates from
the baseline simulation in Table 5. The second row considers the case where labor markets
are deﬁned by geography (separate metropolitan and non-metropolitan markets in each state)
interacted with education (using a binary college-or-not classiﬁcation). This has only small
effects on the estimates, for the EITC producing better outcomes for single women and worse
outcomes for married women. The third row returns to skill-based labor markets, using the
continuous skill distribution discussed in Section 2.5. This makes the EITC look somewhat
more attractive, primarily due to changes in married women’s outcomes.
In my baseline model and in the ﬁrst rows of Table 7, I assume that single and married
women participate in distinct labor markets. This assumption is not theoretically motivated. In
the second set of estimates in each panel of Table 7, I assume that married and single women
compete for the same jobs. This has essentially no effect on the outcomes for all women, but
dramatically improves the impact of the EITC on single mothers. Recall that the labor supply
effectsoftheEITCareofoppositesignsformarried andsinglewomen. Thus, themergingofthe
two labor markets dampens the net change in labor supply and therefore the downward change
in single women’s wages. The NIT results are less sensitive to the assumption about labor
market deﬁnitions, largely because the labor supply of single and married women responds in
the same direction.
Taking the results of the various sensitivity analyses together, I conclude that the labor
market impacts of the two proposed policies are moderately sensitive to reasonable variations
in thelaborsupplyparameters and much lessdependent on theparticularlabormarket deﬁnition
used. They are quite insensitive to the demand elasticity within plausible ranges. The general
conclusion of the earlier analysis, that the superiority of the EITC over the NIT is not robust to
loosening the implicit assumption of perfectly elastic labor demand, does not appear to depend
on the particular modeling choices made there.
7.2 Distributional impacts
Of course, neither the EITC nor the NIT is intended to transfer money to mothers as a class;
both are intended as income support policies for low-wage families with children. Thus, part
of the evaluation of the policies must depend on their distributional effects within demographic
22groups. Table 8 explores the distributional impact of the two proposed programs using the
baseline elasticity parameters.
In Panel A, the estimates use my baseline marital status-education-age market deﬁnitions
and show impacts across the four education categories. For each cell, I show the intended tax
transfer under each policy and the actual transfer (including wage effects) as a share of this,
separately for all women and for single mothers. The total transfer under the EITC, as seen
earlier, is about two thirds of what was intended, and single mothers receive less than half of the
intended transfer. Statutory transfers under each policy are heavily tilted toward women with
below-average education. Under the EITC, “leakage” through reduced wages is largest for the
middle education cells, while in the highest and lowest education groups a larger share of the
tax transfer sticks with the intended recipients. By contrast, under the NIT all four education
groups receive a follow-on transfer from employers that magniﬁes the tax credit. The ratio of
this follow-on transfer to the original credit is increasing in education.
In Panel B, I return to the continuous skill deﬁnition, based on the hourly wage. This makes
it possible to examine the effects of the two policies on each decile of the wage distribution.
Both policies are targeted at the lower end of the distribution, with about 70% of the credits paid
to working women (90% for working single women) going to those in the bottom half of the
wage distribution. Under the EITC, less than two thirds of the intended transfers to low-wage
women stick there, while the small tax transfers to the highest deciles (mostly going to single
women with low annual hours) are accompanied by relatively large wage increases. A similar
pattern appears for the NIT: Though even the lowest deciles obtain larger transfers than were
intended, the magnifying effect of these follow-on transfers is much larger in the higher-wage
categories. Under each policy, the upper-decile wage effects are concentrated among married
women. Even relatively high-wage married women may face positive ATRs (see Figure 4), and
the resulting reduction in their labor supply leads to wage increases in this submarket.
8 Discussion
Analyses of tax and transfer policy, both theoretical and empirical, have tended to ignore the
potentialeffects ofthesepolicieson wagerates. Theimplicitassumptionhas been thattheentire
economic incidence of taxes is on workers. Although some empirical analyses (e.g., Gruber,
1997;Andersonand Meyer,2000)ﬁnd evidenceinsupportofthis, others(Anderson and Meyer,
1997; Kubik, 2004; Leigh, forthcoming) suggest that employers are likely to bear a portion of
the tax burden as well.
The neglect of incidence considerations is defensible in some contexts. But when tax policy
is used explicitly as a tool to manage labor supply incentives, as with the EITC, the issue
23can no longer be ignored. This paper has shown that under reasonable demand elasticities
substantial portions of the funds expended on the EITC are shifted to employers, with negative
consequences both for EITC recipients and for ineligible workers in the same labor markets.
Although the exact magnitudes of these effects are sensitive to the details of the simulation,
their qualitative importance is quite robust.
Many discussions of tax policy have concluded that the EITC resembles the optimal tax
schedule or that it is a cost-effective mechanism for raising the incomes of low-skill workers
with children. All of these are based on ﬁxed-wage analyses in which the results generally turn
on the substantial positive effects of the the EITC on labor supply. Allowing wages to adjust
substantially weakens the case for the EITC. With reasonable parameter values the net effect of
theprogram on theearnings of singlemothersis negligible, as declines in wages offset increases
in hours. Feasible alternative policies, including the NIT, are much more effective.
There are several limitationsto the analysis undertaken here. In addition to those mentioned
earlier, three are worth highlighting as potential directions for future work. First, I have as-
sumed that labor supply elasticities are constant across female workers of different types. It
would be straightforward to extend the formulas in Section 2 to allow for heterogeneity in la-
bor supply behavior. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) estimate a wage elasticity of participation for
married women that is much smaller than those typically obtained for single women. With uni-
form elasticities, the EITC’s negative effect on married women’s labor supply partially offsets
its positive effect on that of single mothers. If in fact married women are less responsive than
are single women, this offsetting effect is overstated, and the EITC’s net wage effects are even
more negative than those presented above.
Second, I have ignored the interaction between my proposed EITC and NIT policies and
other preexisting distortions to the low-skill labor market. These would affect the welfare re-
sults: By treating my proposed policies as the only taxes I have been able to ignore deadweight
losses as second-order, where in fact the EITC might yield ﬁrst-order reductions in deadweight
loss produced by other work-discouraging programs. Interactions between the EITC and other
programs might also have ﬁrst-order effects on the government budget. But my results on after-
tax incomes would not be affected by the inclusion of other programs in the simulation.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the impact of incidence effects on the design
of optimal transfers. The results here indicate that labor-supply-promoting schedules are less
desirable than one might otherwise expect. A plausible consequence is that the optimal tax
should have higher (less negative) tax rates at low incomes. This would be a fruitful topic for
future research.
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Notes:  Series are estimated via local linear regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel 













































Notes:  Figure indicates additional credits available (multiplied by 10^7) as a function of 
earned income for families with one child when a total of $1 is devoted to expanding the 
EITC or to adding an incremental NIT.   
 Figure 4.  Changes in mean marginal and average tax rates associated with 
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Notes: Figure indicates the mean simulated change in tax rates (in percentage points, 
multiplied by 10^10) on women’s earnings when a total of $1 is devoted to expanding the 
EITC or to adding an incremental NIT.  Tax rates are computed using a secondary earner 
model, and treat husband’s earnings and non-labor income as invariant to the program. 
Means are computed over families with children and positive female earnings, and are 
estimated via local linear regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 
0.05 log points.  
 Figure 5.  Net transfers to families under EITC and NIT alternatives, by demand 





























Extensive supply elasticity (sigma_x)
0 ¼ ½ 0 ¼ ½ 0 ¼ ½
Intensive supply elasticity (sigma_i)
Demand elasticity (rho) = -0.3
½¾ 1
Extensive supply elasticity (sigma_x)
0 ¼ ½ 0 ¼ ½ 0 ¼ ½
Intensive supply elasticity (sigma_i)
Demand elasticity (rho) = 0
 
Notes:  Net transfers include both tax credits paid by the government and transfers 
from/to employers due to increased equilibrium wages. Estimates are based on 
simulations of an expansion of the EITC or of a new NIT, each with total cost of $1.  
Estimates corresponding to parameters used in Table 5 are highlighted (lower left panel).  
Horizontal lines indicate the statutory transfer (i.e., the tax credit portion). 









































































Notes:  Net transfers include both tax credits paid by the government and transfers from 
employers due to increased equilibrium wages. Estimates are based on simulations of an 
expansion of the EITC or of a new NIT, each with total cost of $1. Estimates assume σx = 
0.75 and σi = 0.  Y-axis scale varies across panels.  
 Table 1.  The EITC schedule
If y is  the credit is and the marginal tax rate is
less than or equal to 0 0 0
between 0 and C/τ 1 τ 1y- τ 1
between C/τ 1 and p C 0
between p and p+C/τ 2 C-τ 2(y-p) τ 2











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N 7,005 13,139 5,221 1,760 1,261 1,355
% in each EITC segment, observed earnings
Zero earnings 30% 0% 11% 60% 0% 24%
Phase-in 19% 2% 7% 19% 8% 13%
Plateau 10% 2% 5% 8% 8% 11%
Phase-out 23% 10% 18% 11% 25% 26%
Earnings too high 18% 86% 59% 2% 60% 27%
Families with positive female earnings
% with ATR > 0 0% 26% 0% 44%
% with ATR < 0 75% 7% 94% 19%
All education levels Less than a high school diploma
Notes:  See text for sample description.  Families without children and father-only families are 
excluded.  "ATR" = "Average Tax Rate," calculated on a working woman's earnings and treating both 
non-labor income and husband's earnings (if any) as fixed.
Single 
mothers

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:  Across-the-board 1pp increase in ATRs
Relatively inelastic extensive margin (σx = 0.5)
σi=0 -0.50% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.19% +0.63% -- +1.00%
σi=0.25 -0.50% -- -0.27% +0.27% -0.13% +0.43% -- +0.57%
σi=0.5 -0.50% -- -0.22% +0.22% -0.10% +0.32% -- +0.40%
Central estimate of extensive margin elasticity (σx=0.75)
σi=0 -0.75% -- -0.43% +0.43% -0.21% +0.71% -- +1.00%
σi=0.25 -0.75% -- -0.34% +0.34% -0.15% +0.50% -- +0.63%
σi=0.5 -0.75% -- -0.29% +0.29% -0.12% +0.39% -- +0.46%
Unit elastic extensive margin (σx = 1)
σi=0 -1.00% -- -0.50% +0.50% -0.23% +0.77% -- +1.00%
σi=0.25 -1.00% -- -0.40% +0.40% -0.17% +0.56% -- +0.67%
σi=0.5 -1.00% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.13% +0.43% -- +0.50%
Panel B:  Across-the-board 1pp increase in MTRs
Relatively inelastic extensive margin (σx = 0.5)
σi=0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
σi=0.25 -0.38% -- -0.20% +0.20% -0.10% +0.32% -- +0.43%
σi=0.5 -0.75% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.15% +0.48% -- +0.60%
Central estimate of extensive margin elasticity (σx=0.75)
σi=0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
σi=0.25 -0.44% -- -0.20% +0.20% -0.09% +0.29% -- +0.37%
σi=0.5 -0.88% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.14% +0.45% -- +0.54%
Unit elastic extensive margin (σx = 1)
σi=0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
σi=0.25 -0.50% -- -0.20% +0.20% -0.08% +0.28% -- +0.33%
σi=0.5 -1.00% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.13% +0.43% -- +0.50%
Table 3.  Effects of uniform one percentage point tax increases on labor supply and wages, by 
elasticities of supply (σ) and demand (ρ)
Notes:  Table shows the effect of a 1 percentage point across-the-board increase in the ATR (panel A) 
or MTR (panel B).  Change in labor supply combines participation and hours responses, as in equation 
(13).  Change in wage refers to the pre-tax hourly wage.  σx and σi are the elasticity of labor supply on 
the extensive and intensive margins, respectively.  ρ is the elasticity of labor demand.
ρ = -∞ρ  = -1 ρ = -0.3 ρ = 0w/ kids no kids w/ kids no kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:  EITC expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.00 $       0.55 $      - $      0.45 $         - $      
To families with earned income 1.00 $       0.55 $      - $      0.45 $         - $      
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) 0.39 $       0.61 $      - $      (0.22) $        - $      
Change in after-tax income 1.39 $       1.16 $      - $      0.23 $         - $      
Panel B:  NIT expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.00 $       0.67 $      - $      0.33 $         - $      
To families with earned income 0.56 $       0.33 $      - $      0.23 $         - $      
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) (0.62) $      (0.38) $     - $      (0.24) $        - $      
Change in after-tax income 0.38 $       0.29 $      - $      0.09 $         - $      
Notes:  Simulations are of an EITC or NIT expansion targeted at families with children, with total 
expenditure of $1 (in the absence of labor supply or wage effects).  Simulation assumes σx=0.75, σi=0, 
ρ=-∞.  Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
Single women Married women
Table 4.  Impacts of EITC and NIT expansions without incidence effects (perfectly elastic 
demand)
All 
womenTable 5.  Impacts of EITC and NIT expansions with encidence effects (demand elasticity = -0.3)
w/ kids no kids w/ kids no kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:  EITC expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.00 $      0.55 $      - $        0.45 $     - $      
To families with earned income 1.00 $      0.55 $      - $        0.45 $     - $      
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) 0.09 $      0.35 $      (0.20) $     (0.10) $    0.04 $     
Change in wages (in $ of earnings) (0.36) $     (0.31) $     (0.23) $     0.14 $     0.05 $     
Change in total earnings (0.27) $     0.03 $      (0.43) $     0.04 $     0.09 $     
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 0.73 $      0.58 $      (0.43) $     0.49 $     0.09 $     
Net total transfer 0.64 $      0.24 $      (0.23) $     0.59 $     0.05 $     
Panel B:  NIT expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.00 $      0.67 $      - $        0.33 $     - $      
To families with earned income 0.56 $      0.33 $      - $        0.23 $     - $      
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) (0.16) $     (0.23) $     0.14 $      (0.12) $    0.05 $     
Change in wages (in $ of earnings) 0.55 $      0.18 $      0.17 $      0.14 $     0.06 $     
Change in total earnings 0.39 $      (0.06) $     0.30 $      0.02 $     0.12 $     
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 1.39 $      0.61 $      0.30 $      0.35 $     0.12 $     
Net total transfer 1.55 $      0.85 $      0.17 $      0.47 $     0.06 $     
Notes:  Simulations are of an EITC or NIT expansion targeted at families with children, with total 
expenditure of $1 (in the absence of labor supply or wage effects).  Elasticities are σx=0.75, σi=0, ρ=-0.3. 
Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
Single women Married women All 
womenw/ kids no kids w/ kids no kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:  EITC expansion
Intended tax transfer - total 1.00 $       0.55 $       - $         0.45 $         - $      
To families with earned income 1.00 $       0.55 $       - $         0.45 $         - $      
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply 0.01 $       0.22 $       (0.14) $      (0.14) $        0.07 $     
Change in labor force participation 0.19 $       0.36 $       (0.11) $      (0.11) $        0.06 $     
Change in hours | participation (0.18) $      (0.14) $      (0.03) $      (0.02) $        0.02 $     
Change in wages (0.07) $      (0.17) $      (0.11) $      0.15 $         0.06 $     
Change in total earnings (0.07) $      0.05 $       (0.25) $      0.01 $         0.13 $     
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 0.93 $       0.60 $       (0.25) $      0.46 $         0.13 $     
Net total transfer 0.93 $       0.38 $       (0.11) $      0.60 $         0.06 $     
Panel B:  NIT expansion
Intended tax transfer - total 1.00 $       0.67 $       - $         0.33 $         - $      
To families with earned income 0.56 $       0.33 $       - $         0.23 $         - $      
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply (0.14) $      (0.30) $      0.22 $       (0.13) $        0.08 $     
Change in labor force participation (0.16) $      (0.26) $      0.17 $       (0.13) $        0.06 $     
Change in hours | participation 0.02 $       (0.04) $      0.05 $       (0.00) $        0.02 $     
Change in wages 0.53 $       0.18 $       0.16 $       0.13 $         0.06 $     
Change in total earnings 0.39 $       (0.12) $      0.38 $       (0.00) $        0.14 $     
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 1.39 $       0.55 $       0.38 $       0.33 $         0.14 $     
Net total transfer 1.53 $       0.85 $       0.16 $       0.46 $         0.06 $     
Table 6.  Incidence effects with intensive margin responses (intensive labor supply elasticity = 
0.25)
Notes:  Simulations are of an EITC or NIT expansion targeted at families with children, with total 
expenditure of $1 (in the absence of labor supply or wage effects).  Elasticities are σx=0.75, σi=0.25, ρ=-
0.3. Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
Single women Married women All 






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A.  EITC
Markets segmented by marital status
Education-experience 0.64 $         0.24 0.73 0.58
Geography-education 0.60 $         0.29 0.68 0.73
Wage (continuous) 0.78 $         0.34 0.84 0.59
Markets not segmented
Education-experience 0.64 $         0.46 0.73 0.99
Geography-education 0.57 $         0.48 0.63 1.08
Wage (continuous) 0.78 $         0.50 0.84 0.88
Panel B.  NIT
Markets segmented by marital status
Education-experience 1.55 $         0.85 1.39 0.61
Geography-education 1.57 $         0.82 1.42 0.56
Wage (continuous) 1.52 $         0.82 1.37 0.57
Markets not segmented
Education-experience 1.55 $         0.78 1.39 0.49
Geography-education 1.58 $         0.76 1.44 0.44
Wage (continuous) 1.52 $         0.76 1.37 0.46
Net total transfer Change in after-tax income
Notes:  Each row corresponds to a distinct definition of the relevant labor market.  Each 
simulation uses baseline elasticity parameters:  σx=0.75, σi=0, ρ=-0.3.Table 8.  Distribution of net transfers with baseline parameters
Intended Actual 
(as % of 
intended)
Intended Actual 
(as % of 
intended)
Intended Actual 
(as % of 
intended)
Intended Actual 
(as % of 
intended)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Baseline market definitions
Full population 1.000 $ 64% 0.550 $    43% 1.000 $   155% 0.671 $ 126%
By education
Less than high school 0.244 $ 76% 0.090 $    48% 0.354 $   116% 0.227 $ 108%
High school 0.431 $ 64% 0.240 $    40% 0.375 $   157% 0.248 $ 131%
Some college 0.260 $ 51% 0.180 $    40% 0.219 $   181% 0.163 $ 139%
College graduate 0.065 $ 74% 0.041 $    60% 0.053 $   290% 0.033 $ 159%
Panel B: Continuous skill distribution
Full population 1.000 $ 78% 0.550 $    62% 1.000 $   152% 0.671 $ 122%
By education
Less than high school 0.244 $ 80% 0.090 $    64% 0.354 $   113% 0.227 $ 106%
High school 0.431 $ 78% 0.240 $    61% 0.375 $   150% 0.248 $ 123%
Some college 0.260 $ 75% 0.180 $    62% 0.219 $   170% 0.163 $ 131%
College graduate 0.065 $ 80% 0.041 $    60% 0.053 $   357% 0.033 $ 168%
By hourly wage decile
Non-workers 0.207 $ 100% - $        -             0.549 $   100% 0.344 $ 100%
1st decile (bottom) 0.171 $ 67% 0.091 $    58% 0.136 $   122% 0.095 $ 110%
2nd decile 0.167 $ 63% 0.110 $    60% 0.098 $   144% 0.070 $ 118%
3rd decile 0.151 $ 64% 0.110 $    60% 0.074 $   168% 0.054 $ 129%
4th decile 0.138 $ 61% 0.112 $    62% 0.059 $   215% 0.046 $ 149%
5th decile 0.074 $ 68% 0.063 $    65% 0.033 $   257% 0.028 $ 166%
6th decile 0.045 $ 86% 0.034 $    68% 0.023 $   364% 0.017 $ 194%
7th decile 0.016 $ 151% 0.011 $    58% 0.009 $   786% 0.006 $ 368%
8th decile 0.013 $ 186% 0.009 $    76% 0.007 $   847% 0.005 $ 377%
9th decile 0.009 $ 219% 0.005 $    78% 0.006 $   990% 0.004 $ 411%
10th decile (top) 0.009 $ 195% 0.005 $    77% 0.006 $   894% 0.004 $ 359%
Notes:  Simulations use baseline elasticity parameters:  σx=0.75, σi=0, ρ=-0.3.
EITC NIT
Single mothers All women Single mothers All women